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Noncommercial Trading in the Energy Futures Market
by Charles Dale and John Zyren
Introduction1
How do futures markets affect spot market prices?
This is one of the most pervasive questions
surrounding futures markets, and it has been
analyzed in numerous ways for many commodities.
Early researchers concentrated on the relationship
between spot prices and the "term structure" of
futures prices, i.e., the instantaneous values of futures
prices with different maturities.  For example,
Holbrook Working's cost-of-storage concept was The growth of energy futures markets has had a
shown to determine the term structure of futures dramatic impact on the way in which crude oil and
prices in storable agricultural commodity futures petroleum products are marketed (Dale, 1991).  As a
(Brennan, 1958).  Vignola and Dale (1980) showed that result, the Energy Information Administration (EIA),
the cost-of-storage concept can also be applied to the U.S. Government agency having the mission of
financial futures markets, so that the term structure of producing objective analyses of energy markets, often
Treasury bill futures was determined by financing has the task of answering Congressional requests for
costs, not by the unbiased expectations hypothesis of information about futures markets.  For example,
the term structure of interest rates.  More recently, during the Persian Gulf War, Congress had numerous
numerous studies have examined various aspects of questions about the role that futures market
pricing and efficiency in nonagricultural commodities. speculators may have played in driving up crude oil
An alternative way to examine the price impact of (Energy Information Administration, 1990), as the
futures markets is to ask whether or not those traders relative amount of speculative activity did not
who have no commercial interest, commonly referred increase during the price rise, and the massive selling
to as "speculators," can destabilize prices.  Despite a by hedgers in futures markets actually helped to
vast body of research showing that futures markets dampen the crude oil price increase. 
are generally efficient, questions about the role of
speculators repeatedly arise.  This paper utilizes a Recently, the energy trade press has contained a
new approach to the examination of price impacts of number of stories about large speculative funds of
speculators on futures markets. It focuses initially on money trading in energy futures.   Whenever futures
specially obtained data on commodity "pools," which price spikes occur, whether caused by problems in the
are large funds of money that may move quickly Middle East which push up crude oil prices, or cold
between and across futures markets and other weather in the United States that drives up heating oil
financial markets; it then broadens the scope to prices, questions from the Congress about the role of
include large noncommercial traders in general.  This speculators inevitably follow.  Thus, it is important for
research also differs from previous work in its EIA to understand how speculative funds operate, in
comparison and analysis of the holdings of large both normal markets and crisis situations.
commercial and noncommercial traders, and
demonstrates that changes in noncommercial While EIA must monitor energy futures markets, the
positions in energy futures markets are closely related
to price changes in those markets.  The paper
concludes that noncommercial traders are likely to
switch between markets and add to "hot money"
flows, and that noncommercial traders follow price
trends in energy markets rather than set them.
Background
prices.  Such fears were shown to be unfounded
2
combination of market complexity and budgetary
restrictions makes it necessary to frequently work
with other Government agencies.  In particular, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
      This paper was presented at the International Energy1
Workshop, International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, June 20-22, 1995.  The authors
thank John Fenton, Annette Pruss, and George Wang of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Washington, DC,
for their invaluable assistance.      See, for example, Bloomberg Oil Buyers Guide (1995a, 1995b).2
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regulates the futures markets and has a unique term "hedge fund" arose in the 1960s and referred to
combination of databases and staff expertise that can what was, for that time, a sophisticated vehicle for
assist EIA.  Much of the present work was designed to simultaneously buying and selling corporate equities.
enable EIA and the CFTC to work together to More recently, this term began to encompass funds
exchange publicly available information about the that had operations with government securities,
functioning of the energy futures markets in areas foreign currencies, futures and options, and even
such as the price effects of noncommercial traders. merger and acquisition activity.  There is in fact today
One important group of noncommercial traders is no definition of "hedge fund" for regulatory purposes,
called "pools."  A first step is to understand exactly and the term now refers informally to "collective
what "pools" are. investment vehicles organized to avoid complying
Commodity pools are commonly referred to as regardless of how much or how little the funds
"mutual funds for commodity futures," because a participate in other activities, if the hedge funds trade
large number of investors can combine their money to futures contracts and have a large number of
invest in futures markets in a manner similar to that customers they must register with the CFTC as
involved in investing in mutual funds for stock and commodity pool operators.
bond markets.  One early example of such pools was
launched in 1968, when economist Paul Samuelson Hedge funds received widespread public attention in
and several associates pooled $2 million of their own September 1992, when George Soros, who runs the
money to trade in agricultural commodity futures; Quantum Fund, announced that he had made $1
within 12 months they had lost half of their original billion speculating on the devaluation of the British
investment (Crawford, 1994).  In current practice, pound (Jenkins, 1994).  Since then, central bankers,
pools are much more complicated than that.  The finance ministers, and the U.S. Congress have all
CFTC defines a "pool" as a "collective investment expressed concerns about the possible effects that
vehicle, usually a limited partnership because of the hedge fund activity can have on world financial
unavailability of pass-through tax treatment for markets.  Hedge funds have recently begun trading in
corporate forms, that engages in futures transactions energy futures.
either exclusively or in conjunction with other
investment activity" (Holum, 1994).  Commodity Pool The relationship between commodity pools and hedge
Operators (CPOs) must register with the CFTC funds is shown in Figure FE1.  The CFTC has
through the National Futures Association, a private regulatory jurisdiction over the trading of futures
trade group to which the CFTC has delegated its contracts and options on futures contracts for both
registration authority.  CPO's, in turn, usually pools and hedge funds.  Pools are themselves part of
delegate the operations of their pools to one or more the broader class of traders called "speculators," who
Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) who are will be referred to here by the less inflammatory term
professional money managers who must also register "noncommercials."
with the CFTC.  Pools may make public offerings, a
step which would require registration with both the Relatively little prior research has been done on
CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission commodity pools, largely due to a lack of data.
(SEC),  or remain private, by restricting themselves to Brorsen and Irwin (1985) examined the rates of return3
no more than 35 sophisticated investors, a step which of commodity pools as a test of futures market
would exempt them from SEC, but not CFTC, efficiency and concluded that futures markets are
registration. efficient.  They also analyzed public commodity pools
A similar type of "collective investment activity" that useful for portfolio diversification.  Cornew (1986)
has recently received much more attention than pools analyzed private commodity pools and concluded
is a "hedge fund."  The term "hedge fund" is that pools can be modeled better as speculative
confusing, because a "hedger" in futures markets instruments rather than as investment vehicles.  He
refers to an entity that normally has owned or later concluded (Cornew, 1988) that both public and
anticipates owning the underlying commodity, while private pools appear to be speculative investments
a "hedge fund" need not deal in futures at all.  The
with most securities laws" (Holum, 1994).   But,4
(Irwin and Brorsen, 1985) and concluded that they are
      The SEC registers the offering, while the CFTC registers the3
offeror.  Technically speaking, the CFTC registers the CPO, not their owners to a small number of sophisticated investors who
the pool itself. can afford to invest substantial sums of money.
      They can avoid securities laws by, for example, restricting4
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with high expenses relative to either money controlled According to staff in the CFTC Division of Economic
or net asset value.  Edwards and Ma (1988) examined Analysis, in 1994 the minimum reporting levels for
pool prospectuses and concluded that the information holdings in any one contract month were 150 contracts
they contained was not a good indicator of future of unleaded gasoline, 175 contracts of heating oil, and
performance 300 contracts of crude oil; the contract size was 1,000
As shown in Figure FE2, a pool operator may specify whether they ever were "commercial" traders
establish several pools that are run by several or "noncommercial" traders.  Commercials normally
commodity trading advisors.  These same advisors, in own or anticipate owning the physical product and
turn, may be involved in trading futures for several may use the markets for "hedging" to take an
different commodity pool operators.  The result is a offsetting position in the futures market in an attempt
complex web of interlocking relationships between to lock in a cost or profit margin.  "Noncommercial"
pools and advisors. traders are subject to limits on the total positions they
More recently, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (1991) surveyed pools and drew the Using data from its large trader data reporting system,
following conclusions: the CFTC publishes certain aggregate position data
 In 1988, 1200 pools had $7.8 billion in net noncommercial traders.   A sample excerpt from a
assets,  but only 65 large (i.e., assets over $10 CFTC commitment of traders report for unleaded5
million) CPOs controlled 94 percent of the gasoline is shown in Table FE1.  Of 65,380 long and
total.  Among the large CPOs, only about 8 short contracts outstanding during that month, 48,377
percent of the assets were held for trading long contracts (74 percent of the total) and 52,927 short
futures and options. contracts (81 percent of the total) were held by traders
 Pools rarely held more than 10 percent of the 150 contracts.  Most of the reportable contracts were
outstanding contracts in a futures market. held by commercial traders: 42,900 of the long
 There was a statistical tendency for pools to
buy and sell together, but the relationship The reportable noncommercial contracts are first
was not a strong one and the net effect on subdivided into "long only," or owning only contracts
futures prices was unclear. to purchase the underlying commodity at a future
Commitment Report Data
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
maintains a large trader reporting system through
which "futures commission merchants" (i.e., brokers)
are required to report traders' positions above certain
reporting levels.  These reporting levels vary by
market, depending upon, among other things, the size
of the futures markets.  Generally, reporting levels are
set to get most (about two-thirds) of the total "open
interest," which is the number of contracts
outstanding.6
barrels, or 42,000 gallons.  The traders had also to
may hold in futures contracts.
broken out by position sizes of commercial and
7
who had more than the minimum reporting level of
contracts and 48,316 of the short contracts.
date, or "short only," meaning owning only contracts
to sell the underlying commodity at a future date.
These classifications are of interest because they help
to show the net positions of the noncommercial
traders.  If noncommercials are long in some contract
months but hold equal short positions in other months
of the same type of futures contract, they are placed in
a separate "spreading" category.  Table FE1 shows that
1,987 long and short contracts were thusly offset.
Also, 3,490 long contracts and 2,624 short contracts
were held by noncommercials who did not have
offsetting contracts in other months.
The CFTC also reports the number of traders in each
category.  For the data in Table FE1 there were 13 long
only and 11 short only reporting noncommercial
traders, and 8 noncommercial spread traders.  There      In contrast, by 1994 only 4 hedge funds -- Quantum, Tiger,5
Steinhardt, and Omega -- had $25 billion under management
(Economist, 1994).
      Getting a complete picture requires knowledge of positions6
held by foreigners.  Even those pools which are organized      The CFTC published their data twice a month beginning in
offshore, have no U.S. participants, and have a non-U.S. CPO 1986, but since October 1992 they have reported the data
and CTA are subject to the CFTC's large trader reporting weekly.
requirements.
7
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Table FE1. UNLEADED GASOLINE, N.Y. HARBOR - NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE
COMMITMENTS OF TRADERS IN ALL FUTURES COMBINED, MARCH 28, 1995
(Contracts of 42,000 U.S. Gallons)
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 Total Reportable Positions .
                                                                                                                                                                      Nonreportable
Noncommercial                                         Commercial              Total                         Positions
 Open               Long or Short      Long and Short 
 Interest             Only                      (Spreading)                                                                                                                
                            Long   Short        Long   Short                  Long    Short             Long     Short           Long    Short   
 65,380               3,490    2,624        1,987   1,987                  42,900   48,316          48,377    52,927         17,003   12,453
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Source:  Commodity Futures Trading Commission (1995).
were 45 long and 45 short reporting commercial managed money traders.  The CFTC gathered specific
traders. pool data for the 6-month period of April 19948
It is important to note that the CFTC commitment data short positions of pools for a number of commodities.
refer to all types of large traders.  There is no The present work initially used this pool data for
distinction between pools, hedge funds, or any other energy futures, with several objectives.  First, the 6-
type of noncommercial trader, such as a pension fund. month period covered by pool data was examined in
It is also not immediately clear how the detail to seek relationships between pool positions
"nonreportables" category should be used in analysis. and prices.  Second, if proxies in the weekly
It might be assumed that, because these traders have commitment of traders data can be found that
relatively small positions, they are all noncommercial adequately represent pool activity, then the routinely
traders, but does this category also include some available commitment reports from the CFTC can be
commercial traders that are hedging?  While for most used not only for the analysis in this paper but also to
markets the nonreportable category may indeed assist EIA in monitoring conditions in energy futures
consist of mostly speculators, the heating oil market in markets.
particular has many small oil dealers who hedge in
the futures market but don't have positions large Figure FE3 shows nearby futures prices and Figure
enough to be reportable.  Thus, care must be taken FE4 shows the corresponding pool positions for
when deciding how to use the commitment reports for unleaded gasoline.  While short positions were
analysis. negligible until mid-August, long pool positions
Special Pool Data Collection
The CFTC provided EIA with position data from its
large trader database on "managed money traders,"
i.e., CPO's, CTA's, hedge funds, and account It is difficult to formulate testable hypotheses about
executives registered as associated persons who noncommercial trading activity.  However, two
control customer accounts.  Hereafter, the term "pools" distinct types of activity can be analyzed.  First, there
will be a shorthand term for this broader category of is the question of intermarket activity, or what might
through September 1994 and calculated the long and
tracked futures prices extremely closely.  Those
figures invited further study.
Hypotheses
be referred to as a "hot money" hypotheses, i.e., do
large noncommercial traders tend to concentrate in a
single market or do they shift large sums between
different markets at the first sign of a possible higher
rate of return?  The sudden shifting of large sums of
      There is other information on the commitment reports,8
which were originally designed for agricultural commodities
to show the differences in holdings between different crop
years.  Since "crop years" is not a useful concept in energy
futures markets, the other types of reported data are ignored
here.
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Figure FE3.  Nearby Gasoline Futures Price
Figure FE4.  Percent of Open Interest Held by Pools
xx Energy Information Administration / Petroleum Marketing Monthly May 1996
so-called "hot money" between markets presents a column represents a different equation for changes in
potential for destabilizing those markets. contract holdings.  An important characteristic of the9
Second, there are questions of how large significant.  This is noted by the asterisks next to those
noncommercial traders affect prices in futures numbers, indicating whether they were estimated to
markets.  There are three possible ways that trading be significantly different from zero.  For the present
activity can affect prices:  1) noncommercials may be context, the most important characteristic of the
price setters when their trading activity is an important statistically significant terms is their sign:  a
determinant of the price level; 2) noncommercials may significant positive coefficient means that if the
be trend followers when they don't determine prices parameter increases, then the number of contracts
but merely try to follow perceived longer-term price associated with the parameter increases, e.g., if
trends, either up or down; 3) finally, there may be no WPRICE, or crude oil futures prices, increase, then the
relationship whatsoever between noncommercial number of long crude oil futures contracts will
trading and prices.  Regression analyses can be increase.  The opposite is true for minus signs.
conducted to examine these questions.  The following Finally, the last 4 rows are important primarily for
section shows that: 1) noncommercials systematically analysis purposes.  The statistically significant AR(1)
shift their contract holdings between energy futures and AR(3) ("autoregressive") terms mean that changes
markets and Treasury bond futures markets, and 2) in contract holdings in that week might depend partly
they follow price trends, rather than cause them. on changes that occurred 1 or 3 weeks ago.  This is a10
Further examination of this hypothesis is discussed common effect with highly seasonal commodities,
below, where regression analysis is used and such as heating oil.  The adj. ("adjusted") R  term
commercial and noncommercial traders are refers to the percentage change in the contract
compared. holdings that were explained by the equation used,
Regression Results - 
Noncommercial Traders
The regression results in Table FE2 and Table FE3
show the behavior of noncommercial traders.   Each11
estimated coefficients is whether they are statistically
2
while the last 2 rows refer to other statistical measures
of the quality of the regression equations.
The important regression results may be summarized
as follows.  First, there were statistically significant
positive coefficients for every “nearby,” i.e., next
expiring, futures contract price in the regression for
the number of long holdings for that contract, e.g., a
price increase of crude oil led to an increase in long
crude oil contract holdings.  Similarly, there were
statistically significant negative coefficients for prices
that correspond to short holdings, e.g., a price increase
of crude oil led to a decrease in short crude oil
contract holdings.  These results mean that in the
same weekly period, a price rise in nearby futures
contracts is associated with a purchase of additional
long contracts and a selling of short contracts.  This
contemporaneous correlation strongly suggests that
energy traders follow price trends, they don’t set
them.  They buy on price rallies and sell into price
dips.  
Secondly, The negative coefficient for Treasury futures
prices in the long crude oil equation means that
during a particular weekly period, a decrease in T-
bond prices is associated with an increase in long
crude oil contract holdings.  This gives support for
evidence of hot money activity.  If Treasury bond 
      An implied assumption is that the hot money constitutes9
the part of the pools' overall portfolios that is dedicated to
maximizing returns at high risk.  This would explain their
rapidly shifting behavior in the absence of a clear budget
constraint.  As noted earlier, only about 10  percent of pools'
holdings were in futures related contracts.
      Subsequent to the completion of this research, in an10
interview with hedge fund operator George Soros, his trading
activity was characterized as that of a "trend follower"
(Fromson, 1995).  This anecdotal evidence from the most
famous hedge fund operator supports the conclusions reached
in this paper.
      The empirical model used for this investigation has the11
general form
C  = f( P , P , P , CN  )i i wti tb j
where  means the weekly change, C  represents the numberi
of contracts (long or short) of noncommercial traders, P  (in thei
heating oil and gasoline equations) is the corresponding contract price, P  is the nearby Treasury bond futures contract
“nearby,” i.e., next expiring, futures contract price of heating price, and CN  represents the net positions of related futures
oil or unleaded gasoline, P  is the nearby crude oil futures contracts.wti
tb
j
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Table FE2. REGRESSION RESULTS FOR LONG NONCOMMERCIAL CONTRACT HOLDINGS 
October 6, 1992, through June 27, 1995
                                                                                                                                                                               
    Noncommercial Long Contracts (dependent variable)
Parameter Crude Oil Gasoline Heating Oil Treasury Bonds
                                                                                                                                                                 
 WNCETLNG  0.0142 -0.0123  0.1848**
      (0.0237) (0.0267) (0.0926)
 MNCETLNG  0.2507  0.1628 -0.3558**
      (0.1795) (0.0671) (0.2545)
 HNCETLNG  0.2259  0.2583  0.0898***
      (0.1406) (0.0467) (0.2002)
 TNCETLNG -0.0103 -0.0355  0.0084**
      (0.0406) (0.0148) (0.0166)
 WPRICE   3157  -962  -518 -2727*** ** *
         (924) (460) (569) (1449)
 MPRICE   499***
  (124)
 HPRICE   790***
  (214)
 TPRICE   -787    11  -236  1807** ***
           (379) (140) (148) (493)
 AR(3) -0.2687***
  (0.0849)
adj. R  0.249  0.358  0.253  0.1102
F-Statistic   12.7   16.7    8.8    5.3
D.W. statistic  2.337  2.035  2.027  2.316
                                                                                                                                                                 
The general form of the linear model is described in footnote 11.   is the weekly change.
WPRICE, MPRICE, HPRICE and TPRICE denote the nearby futures contract price for crude oil, motor
gasoline, heating oil, and Treasury bonds, respectively.
WNCETLNG, MNCETLNG, HNCETLNG and TNCETLNG denote the net long positions in noncommercial
contracts for crude oil, motor gasoline, heating oil, and Treasury bonds, respectively.
Standard errors appear in parentheses below parameter estimates.
*** indicates significant at 1% criteria (p-value < 0.01).
**  indicates significant at 5% criteria (p-value < 0.05).
*   indicates significant at 10% criteria (p-value < 0.10).
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Table FE3. REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SHORT NONCOMMERCIAL CONTRACT HOLDINGS 
October 6, 1992, through June 27, 1995
                                                                                                                                                                               
     Noncommercial Short Contracts (dependent variable)
Parameter Crude Oil Gasoline Heating Oil Treasury Bonds
                                                                                                                                                                 
 WNCETLNG -0.0345 -0.0941   0.1461** ***
       (0.0157) (0.0244) (0.0917)
 MNCETLNG -0.2344 -0.3184   0.3782***
       (0.1456) (0.0597) (0.2425)
 HNCETLNG -0.2103 -0.0794  -0.4658* ** **
       (0.1140) (0.0309) (0.1927)
 TNCETLNG -0.0334 -0.0154 -0.0251
      (0.0329) (0.0098) (0.0155)
 WPRICE  -3639   366   498  -1975***
          (749) (304) (540) (1436)
 MPRICE  -400**
  (82)
 HPRICE  -483**
  (200)
 TPRICE   -187   114  -129  -1804***
           (307) (93) (143) (486)
 AR(1) -0.2115 -0.2637** ***
    (0.0859) (0.0840)
adj. R  0.318  0.369  0.455  0.1842
F-Statistic   17.5   17.5   20.5    7.3
D.W. statistic  2.094  2.065  2.054  2.062
                                                                                                                                                                 
The general form of the linear model is described in footnote 11.   is the weekly change.
WPRICE, MPRICE, HPRICE and TPRICE denote the nearby futures contract price for crude oil, motor
gasoline, heating oil, and Treasury bonds, respectively.
WNCETLNG, MNCETLNG, HNCETLNG and TNCETLNG denote the net long positions in noncommercial
contracts for crude oil, motor gasoline, heating oil, and Treasury bonds, respectively.
Standard errors appear in parentheses below parameter estimates.
*** indicates significant at 1% criteria (p-value < 0.01).
**  indicates significant at 5% criteria (p-value < 0.05).
*   indicates significant at 10% criteria (p-value < 0.10).
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prices are sharply falling, noncommercial traders will Bloomberg Oil Buyers Guide. "Money Managers Move
liquidate long Treasury bond futures holdings and Out Of Oil, Into Equities." July 10, 1995b. 3.
buy long crude oil futures contracts.  Since crude oil
futures are the largest and least seasonal of the energy Brennan, M. J. "The Supply of Storage." American
contracts considered here, it is not surprising that Economic Review, 1958. 48:50-72.
noncommercial traders would concentrate most of
their intermarket switching there. Brorsen, B. W., and S. H. Irwin. "Examination of
Conclusions
The media often use the term "hot money" to describe
investment flows that move quickly between different
markets, seeking the highest possible returns.
Certainly many noncommercial investment funds,
including both commodity pools and hedge funds,
would potentially fall into that category.  This paper
concludes, first, that noncommercial traders follow
price trends; they don't set them.   Second,12
noncommercial traders are likely to switch rapidly
their holdings between markets.  These results are
closely related.  The fact that noncommercial traders
follow price trends means that they are therefore
likely to switch between markets and add to overall
hot money flows.  The amount of money in hedge
funds and commodity pools has grown substantially
in recent years, so the potential for sudden huge
movements of money between markets will remain
for the foreseeable future.
Because 1994 was a bad year for many hedge funds,
there was widespread belief that money managers
would abandon multiple market strategies (Reerink,
1995).  In contrast, in the oil futures markets some
money managers, particularly in oil futures, seemed
not only to be continuing with multiple market
strategies, but to be refining them from simplistic
tradeoffs between markets to examining each market
independently (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1995a).
This is an interesting area for future research.  In any
case, the results of this analysis have shown that
noncommercials don't set futures prices but, instead,
follow price trends. This is an important conclusion.
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